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5:22 PM] I’ve been following a couple of debates and thoughts on other weblogs about the
Kay report. [I want to stay true to my original idea of this not becoming a name-dropping list of links to other weblogs so I won’t mention who they are – but they are the typical big names] One of the arguments being made – and it is along the same lines as the Bush administration – was 'see, we told you had these programs; we never said he necessarily had the weapons themselves, but his programs represented and imminent threat.'
There are several problems with this. The first of which is now the administration wants to make the firm distinction between a weapons program and the programs themselves. Sure, no weapons, but we have evidence of the programs. But before the war and even before the inspectors left, the administration used those terms synonymously, creating an image in the public mind that a program and WMD went hand in hand and where you find one, you find the other. So in making the case for war, saying Saddam had a program meant he was hiding weapons.
The next problem undermines the first no matter which side you’re on. What constitutes a program? My interpretation of Kay’s report is that he goes out of his way to use careful language to avoid declaring the discovery of a program.
It’s one thing to have a program and another to maintain the expertise to start a program. Unless you rounded up all the nuclear physicists, chemists, and engineers in Iraq – including those not working on anything scientific, even non-weapons related – one could still say that Saddam maintained the expertise to start a nuclear program. It’s not a black and white issue, but Kay also doesn’t specifically say that evidence of a program (chem, bio, or nuclear) was found.
We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.
A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.
Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS). [note: Kay characterizes, ‘useful’ not ‘essential’.]
Here are more Kay examples that were cited by a particular weblog (and the author of the weblog to be fair has no particular technical expertise) as indications of Saddam maintaining a threat (which I concede) to the U.S. (which is untrue).
* A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.
* Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.
* Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
* Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles --probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment.
Again Kay is fuzzy on specifics. What does “continuing covert capability” mean? What does “advanced design work” mean? Advance in progress or technology (the classified report probably address the latter issue)?
But those points aside, none of these four points represents a threat to the U.S. It’s worth noting that the four points deal with delivery systems. Fourteen years after then end of the Cold War only two countries could strike the U.S. with a ballistic missile (and no North Korea cannot): China and Russia. Why? Because it’s damned hard to build an ICBM. This is why even if all of these findings were even more advanced, I’d still sleep well. Again, let’s concede that Saddam is bad guy and that he probably wanted, and likely up until the summer of 2002, had weapons of mass destruction in the literal sense. Be he still at that point didn’t represent a threat to the U.S. Today we’re even further removed from that threat and we’re not even sure if these weapons existed going back to my generous starting point. If we want to talk about regional threats or threats to human rights and liberty, fine. But we can’t parse words and exaggerate when it comes to hardware. A program is a program, not wishful thinking even if there are people who could in reality constitute it. By that token then the U.S. has a biological weapons program and so does every other highly industrialized nation. I make this last point not to be hyperbolic but to say it is that important to be precise about weapons, programs, equipment, and intent – especially if we ask people to risk their lives because of these things.