Friday, June 27, 2003
Saturday, June 21, 2003
Wednesday, June 18, 2003
Tuesday, June 17, 2003
I don’t put it past this administration to cherry pick intelligence to build its case against Iraq; but there are multiple issues being conflated in rightly criticizing the administration. First was there inconclusive evidence that Iraq still possessed WMD and did administration officials simply choose to present the information that supported its case? The second scenario incorporates the first – there was inconclusive intelligence reporting, but Saddam did in fact have chemical and biological weapons as late as summer 2002, but destroyed them before the war (and as I believe, before UNMOVIC inspectors entered Iraq last November). Whether the administration was deceitful or not is a separate issue from the under-explored proposition that Saddam ordered the weapons destroyed to (unsuccessfully) avert war.
Incidentally, according the WP the 507th had fallen far behind the rest of the convoy and did not receive word of a change in route. By this time they were out of radio range and were improvising. Is CNN not reading the Post these days? Doesn’t Aaron Brown take a look at the next day’s papers each night?
Monday, June 16, 2003
Sunday, June 15, 2003
Thursday, June 12, 2003
Wednesday, June 11, 2003
But Iran will not accept far greater transparency, or abandon its sensitive fuel cycle facilities, in response to economic or military threats. The United States, Russia, and other concerned states need to develop a strategy of incentives and disincentives aimed at bringing Iran into the international community while simultaneously reducing the risk that Iran will build nuclear weapons. The current melange of policies being pursued by the United States, Russia, and others seems certain to increase the risk that Iran will emerge in a few years with a nuclear arsenal.
Monday, June 09, 2003
Q Sir, is U.S. credibility on the line over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?
THE PRESIDENT: I'm not exactly sure what that means. I mean, Iraq had a weapons program. Intelligence throughout the decade showed they had a weapons program. I am absolutely convinced with time we'll find out that they did have a weapons program. The credibility of this country is based upon our strong desire to make the world more peaceful and the world is now more peaceful after our decision; the strong desire to make sure free nations are more secure -- our free nations are now more secure; and the strong desire to spread freedom. And the Iraqi people are now free and are learning the habits of freedom and the responsibilities that come with freedom.
Today, this article in the NYT sees the same dynamic with regards to the Saddam-Al Qaida link. Reportedly, both Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed have separately told their interrogators that there was no cooperation between al-Qaida and Saddam. A CIA report circulated about these revelations. However, this intelligence according to an insider was dubious. “A senior intelligence official played down the significance of their debriefings, explaining that everything Qaeda detainees say must be regarded with great skepticism.” Regarded with great skepticism? Aren’t all those movements in the terror alert status from yellow to orange based in large part on information gleaned from al-Qaida suspects in custody? When we can’t even get answers that make sense, whether we like what here or not, something is amiss.
Wednesday, June 04, 2003
Kaplan writes later in his essay that China has supplied some 1,000 gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment that will likely be operational in the next 18 months (what happened to fruition within months, not a year and a half). Because the centrifuges are online does not bomb quantities of highly enriched uranium make. It’s not that easy. Ask the Iraqis. The significance is that Iran will not have a bomb in the next year or two. We have time.
A second point, which hawks generally are loath to admit, is that Iran has done nothing wrong. It has not violated its NPT commitments. It’s permitted to enrich its own uranium. Ah, the dual-use problem. And it is a problem. But a military strike on Iran because we think they might have bad intentions wouldn’t go over too well. Kaplan glosses over this point.
Unfortunately, neither the IAEA strategy nor the democratic revolution strategy is likely to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. To begin with, chances are slim that ElBaradei, who only months ago was exchanging insults with the Bush administration, will supply Washington with any evidence that supports its position. "It will be very tricky to get the IAEA to do anything," says David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, "particularly since the U.S. and ElBaradei are at war with one another" over Iraq. And, in the unlikely event that ElBaradei does present a damning case, this hardly guarantees the acquiescence of the IAEA board, whose members include countries actively involved in building up Iran's nuclear capabilities, such as Russia and China.
Kaplan writes as if it is a fact that Iran has violated NPT obligations and has moved on to the upcoming conspiracy to ignore this “fact.” This is a good strategy for the Iran hawks because refuting it requires more than average knowledge about the NPT and Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—something that Kaplan demonstrates is easy to gloss over without it being obvious.Does Iran have nuclear weapons ambitions? Sure. But those ambitions thus far have stopped short of violating any international agreements. Should we be vigilant considering scenarios and responses? Of course. But let’s keep the facts in perspective. Remember the hysteria surround last November’s seizure of North Korean missiles bound for Yemen? The missiles were eventually allowed on to Yemen. North Korea hadn’t violated any laws and to the contrary of what many pundits claimed, did not violate any treaties on missiles—there aren’t any as I’ve mentioned here before. The Missile Technology Control Regime is not a binding treaty. It’s a gentleman’s agreement, to which North Korea is not a party to.
Same principle with Iran. So let’s move past using NPT violations as a backdrop for policy options until there are actually IAEA violations.
A better, if longer (but very readable), article on dealing with the Iran challenge can be found here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


